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ARCS OF INSTABILITY
U.S. Relations in the Greater Middle East
Geoffrey Kemp
What do we mean by “the Middle East”? There is no single, agreed definitionof its political or geographic boundaries. Geographers, historians, jour-
nalists, and government bureaucrats all use the term, yet they frequently mean
different things.
The Department of State speaks of “the Near East,” to include North Africa,
the Levant, and the Gulf countries—but not Turkey, since that state is a member
of Nato. In contrast, the Department of Defense divides the region another way.
U.S. Central Command has responsibility for military operations in a zone that
includes Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia, Jordan, Saudi Ara-
bia, Iraq, Iran, the Gulf Cooperation Council states, Central Asia, Afghanistan,
and Pakistan. Excluded are the Caucasus, Turkey, Israel, Syria, and India; the
first four remain under the responsibility of European Command, while India
falls under Pacific Command.
The breakup of the Soviet Union and the establishment of the newly inde-
pendent republics of the Caucasus (Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia) and
Central Asia (Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and
Kazakhstan) raised new questions about where exactly the Middle East begins,
where it ends, and whether it can be comprehensively, consistently delimited.
How then should we define the Middle East? One option would be to use the
phrase “Greater Middle East,” which has gained some currency. So formal a des-
ignation, however, implies a degree of precision that is not presently justified. It
assumes there is a generally accepted definition of which countries to include
and which to exclude (as in the case of continents—say, the line between Asia
and Africa). In fact, however, selection is bound to be arbitrary, because ratio-
nales for including one country and excluding another are based on judgments
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as to what the determinant variables are. If one is primarily interested in strate-
gic geography rather than religion or political alliances, one necessarily selects
countries differently from those who would wish to analyze, say, the Muslim
world or the Cold War confrontation states.
For our purposes, let us include the Caucasus, Central Asia, and South Asia,
as well as Turkey and the traditional Middle East countries in a broad definition
of “the Greater Middle East.” That brings us to a new term requiring defini-
tion—the “arc of instability.”
In the vast Greater Middle East are several arcs of instability, not just one. The
most obvious arc follows the historical “Fertile Crescent,” from the Nile Valley
along the Mediterranean coast through Lebanon and Syria into Mesopotamia
and the northern Persian Gulf. Two other arcs are notably unstable, one running
from Turkey through the Caucasus to Iran, the other from Iran through Afghan-
istan and Pakistan to India. Within these three arcs lie most of the dangerous
conflicts that worry us today—Arab-Israel, Armenia-Azerbaijan, Iraq-Kuwait,
Iraq-Iran, Turkey-Iraq, India-Pakistan, Afghanistan. Three countries have nu-
clear arsenals (Israel, India, and Pakistan); Iraq and Iran aspire to be nuclear
states. If proliferation continues, Turkey and Saudi Arabia could join this list.
It is necessary to remember two other geographical concepts that are worthy
of note in connection with arcs. First, in an area stretching from southern Russia
to the southern Persian Gulf lies a “strategic energy ellipse” that contains over 60
percent of the world’s proven oil reserves and approximately 80 percent of the
world’s proven natural gas. This ellipse will be one of the key strategic prizes in
the geopolitics of the twenty-first century. Second, since President George W.
Bush’s 29 January 2002 State of the Union address, we have had to take into ac-
count another geographical phenomenon, an “axis of evil” that stretches from
North Korea to Iran and Iraq.
Given this geopolitical framework, let us focus on three developments since
11 September 2001 that concern U.S. security policy. The first is the extraordi-
nary realignment of relationships in the Middle East (as we have defined it); as a
result of the terrorist events, new ties with the United States have been formed by
many nations. The second is the growing pressure from the Bush administration
to end the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. The third concerns the compli-
cated and confused state of American relations with Iran and how that country
relates to key items on the American agenda—terrorism, proliferation, and re-
gional stability.
NEW U.S. ALIGNMENTS
Consider the new strategic realities in the Greater Middle East that have
emerged from the 11 September attacks. The United States has deployed military
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forces or training missions and can use military facilities in the following coun-
tries: Pakistan, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, and Qatar. It has access to facilities in Egypt, Is-
rael, and India, and it could, if it wished, establish closer military ties with
Azerbaijan and Georgia. It has established closer intelligence cooperation with
Syria, Yemen, and Sudan. In addition, it has a formidable naval presence in the
eastern Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Sea, and the Indian Ocean.
No American military presence in Central Asia could exist without Russian
approval; the fact that such approval has been given reflects the major change in
U.S.-Russian relations since 11 September. Rhetoric in the United States and the
West concerning Russia’s crackdown on terrorism in Chechnya and elsewhere
has accordingly been much reduced. If this new alliance survives a number of
short-term challenges, it could set the stage for a reassessment of American pol-
icy toward the Caucasus and Central Asia, where until recently the United States
has been willing to challenge Russia’s attempts at dominance. There could also
be a parallel Russian reassessment of its policies toward the Middle East, partic-
ularly Iran and Iraq, policies that have been seen as contrary to American inter-
ests and security concerns. The indications are that President Vladimir Putin
has considerable support for such a reassessment, although how far he is pre-
pared to be more restrictive on Iran and Iraq remains to be seen. Certainly Rus-
sia is now engaged with the United States in far-reaching discussions on matters
relating to weapons development and the proliferation of weapons of mass de-
struction into the Middle East. The improvement in U.S.-Russian relations has
deferred, at least for the time being, speculation about alternative strategic alli-
ances involving China, and possibly India, designed to check American hege-
monic tendencies.
Relations with China
China, as much as Russia, wants good relations with the United States at this
time, primarily for economic reasons. The recent downturn in the American
economy, together with the economic effects of the 11 September attacks, raised
the prospect of a global recession. Deterioration could accelerate dramatically
were there further terrorist attacks against the United States or other major eco-
nomic powers, such as in Europe. This in turn would have a most negative im-
pact on China’s growth prospects and upon Russia’s hope to parlay better
economic relations with the West. For these reasons, no global counterweight to
the new U.S.-Russia relationship seems likely for the time being. The relative
lack of international response to President Bush’s decision to withdraw from the
Anti–Ballistic Missile Treaty suggests that better relations with the United States
K E M P 6 3
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outweigh for other governments the strategic consequences of an American
missile defense program.
Changing Relationships with India and Pakistan
Prior to 11 September, a better relationship with India had been one of the few
significant changes in American foreign policy under the Bush administration.
India seemed destined to have new, special ties with Washington, and this pros-
pect was reflected in India’s support of American missile-defense proposals and
frequent allusions to greater economic ties between the two countries. Pakistan,
in contrast, was increasingly isolated—almost a pariah state, analogous to Iraq
or North Korea.
The speed with which President Pervez Musharraf adapted to the events of 11
September demonstrated his extraordinary survival skills. Pakistani coopera-
tion has been essential to the American war against terrorism and has taken
place without jeopardizing America’s new relations with India. True, India has
been frustrated and annoyed by certain U.S. policies, particularly Washington’s
reluctance to regard terrorism against India by Pakistani-sponsored groups as
being as serious as the attacks on New York and Washington. Nonetheless, the
United States has now become an honest broker between India and Pakistan,
trying to prevent a nuclear war over the issues of Kashmir and terrorism.
Musharraf, in turn, has gone farther than other Muslim leaders in speaking
out against religious extremism. He is taking firm steps to crack down on the
madrassehs, extremist Islamic schools, and their financing by foreign countries
and individuals. He and many other Pakistanis have concluded that radical Is-
lam is detrimental to the long-term interests of their Islamic state. However, the
U.S. military presence in Pakistan may be contributing to growing anti-American
sentiment in the country, evidenced by the kidnapping and murder of the Wall
Street Journal’s Daniel Pearl in Karachi. Washington fears that domestic turmoil
could lead to the destabilization of General Musharraf ’s regime and pave the
way for an Islamic fundamentalist government. If such a government were to
take control of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, it is unlikely that India would sit qui-
etly and watch. A major Indian attack would drag the entire subcontinent into a
war—a situation that recently came dangerously close to playing out. Both
countries are currently expanding their stockpiles and seeking various advanced
military technologies. In that arena, the 11 September attacks reinforced some
of the problems that U.S. policy already faced.
Whether or not Musharraf survives and is eventually able to hand over rule
to a democratic government remains uncertain. As of this writing, American
relations with Islamabad and New Delhi are good. America’s previous
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preoccupation with such issues as nuclear nonproliferation on the subcontinent
has ceased to be the priority, as it had been for most of the 1980s and 1990s.
U.S. Relations with Afghanistan
The United States, through its prompt and successful military actions against
the Taliban, brought into being a new, ideally democratic Afghan regime headed
by an interim leader (later confirmed), Hamid Karzai. In hopes that new at-
tempts at nation building in Afghanistan will succeed, large sums of money have
already been committed to the reconstruction of the country. There is interna-
tional consensus that without such foreign aid Afghanistan could once more be-
come a source of international terrorism.
The future of Afghanistan will depend not just on the United States but on its
relations with Pakistan, Iran, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Russia,
China, and India. These countries have different agendas, and it could be that
the struggle for Afghanistan will yet be a long and bloody one. Reports allege
that Iran is supplying weapons to certain Afghans as part of an effort to
destabilize the western provinces. Tehran, for its part, has a strategic interest in
preventing an American-backed government with no Shia representation from
taking power; the U.S. government, in turn, is concerned that Iranian officials
may be training local soldiers and placing agents in Afghanistan to bully local
leaders into subservience to Tehran.
If Afghan provinces start acting on their own or against other provinces, the
central government will collapse. Nevertheless, the United States is deeply in-
volved in ensuring Afghanistan’s stable future, as indeed are the European
Union countries and Japan. This bodes well for development in the region, pro-
vided that the external powers can resolve confrontations and conflicts between
themselves, and provided that the Afghans continue to avoid the easy descent
into warlordism and violence. The Bush administration had no interest in Af-
ghanistan when it came into office—but as any student of history knows, events
change everything.
U.S.-Saudi Relations
American relations with Saudi Arabia have recently gone through their most tu-
multuous period in modern memory. The fact that many of the perpetrators of
11 September were Saudi citizens (albeit living in exile) and that money from
Saudi Arabia supported the Taliban and (indirectly) al-Qa‘ida operations to a
significant extent highlighted the ambiguous nature of the U.S. relationship
with Riyadh. The kingdom has been both cooperative and obstructive in the war
on terrorism; for example, the government froze the financial accounts of Saudi
nationals and organizations that the United States identified as sponsors of
K E M P 6 5
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terrorism, but it did not grant American officials access to domestic intelligence
information.
For the first time, the world is scrutinizing the house of al-Saud and calling its
style of governance into question. Following the discovery of oil, Saudi Arabia
became a “renter state,” rendering its merchant class redundant as a source of
state revenue and hence unrepresented in the government decision-making pro-
cess. Achieving political quiescence in this situation involved substantial pay-
offs, some of which were then channeled to militant and terrorist groups who
have since been providing money and ideological guidance to networks all over
the Middle East.
In trying to maintain a firm hold on power, the Saudi royal family has been
wary of upsetting the religious Right and reluctant to round up active militant
groups for fear of unrest and charges of monarchical illegitimacy and religious
deviance. Accordingly, its approach has been accommodation rather than con-
frontation. The presence of the U.S. military on Saudi soil does not help, and
neither does the poor state of the
nation’s economy. Hit by volatility
in the price of oil, Saudi citizens
no longer enjoy to the extent they
once did the fruits of their enor-
mous welfare state. Instead, they
face high levels of unemployment
and potential cuts in subsidies, should Saudi Arabia join the World Trade Orga-
nization. The current system has fostered social rigidity, terrorism, and civil un-
rest; conversely, many Americans are asking why their government supports a
corrupt, autocratic monarchy that has a bad human rights record and turns a
blind eye to terrorism outside its borders.
The answer, of course, is that the United States and the industrialized world
remain critically dependent upon Gulf oil, to which there is no short-term alter-
native. The United States imports 18 percent of its imported oil from Saudi Ara-
bia; for that reason it has been reluctant to confront unpalatable domestic Saudi
practices. Russia would like to play a more important role in the oil market, and
Iraq may eventually be able to add several millions of barrels per day. However,
Saudi Arabia remains the only country with the surplus capacity to make up
shortfalls in the event of a serious interruption of supply from other major
producers.
Much of the antagonism between Saudi Arabia and the United States has
been fought out in the press in both countries. The two governments themselves
have retained good relations, and it is likely that the relationship will weather the
current storm. But the public nature of the dispute has raised questions in the
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collective American political mind as to how long U.S. forces need to be kept in
the Gulf. One of the reasons argued for action to rid Iraq of Saddam Hussein is
that it would remove the need for a major American military presence on the
landmass of Arabia, which in turn was one of the primary justifications Osama
Bin Laden used for attacking America.
Statements made by Crown Prince Abdullah indicate that Saudi Arabia
wishes to play a major part in restarting the Arab-Israeli peace process and calm-
ing Muslim anger in, and concerning, that region. The crown prince has sug-
gested a proposal for peace that might include acceptance of Israeli control over
the Western Wall and Jewish neighborhoods in East Jerusalem. The importance
of this initiative is that Saudi Arabia, as the protector of Medina and Mecca,
wields great prestige, influence, and financial leverage in the entire Arab world
and may be in a position to effect change. Saudi reluctance to compromise over
the issue of Jerusalem during the Camp David talks was one of the reasons the
talks failed.
THE “AXIS OF EVIL”
If the United States has effectively formed a new Greater Middle Eastern coali-
tion, several countries remain outside it. The most troubling are those identified
by the president as “evil” in his State of the Union address—Iraq, Iran, and
North Korea.
Perhaps the president could have made his points about these three countries
in a more nuanced manner and yet have been tough on the issues, but in fact Iraq
and Iran are the most troublesome regimes now facing the United States in the
Middle East. How to handle them will require adroit diplomacy.
Washington’s ongoing internal review of Iraqi policy remains contentious.
While the White House believes Saddam Hussein must be removed from power
before the end of the president’s first term in 2005, how and when to topple the
regime has not been determined. Likewise, whether an American effort will be
part of an international coalition or a unilateral confrontation is unclear.
Three basic plans on Saddam’s ouster are believed to be circulating through-
out the administration. They are not mutually exclusive. One approach, drawing
upon lessons from the recent war in Afghanistan, calls for a short, intense mili-
tary campaign using overwhelming airpower and limited U.S. ground forces;
forces generated by the indigenous and exiled Iraqi opposition would take the
lead in replacing the regime as it began to collapse. A second military plan is
more conservative and posits a major buildup of American military forces in the
region, to include upward of two hundred thousand U.S. ground troops. Prepa-
ration for such a level of effort might take a year. The assumption here is that
American forces would have to do most of the fighting on the land as well as in
K E M P 6 7
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the air to ensure a decisive outcome. Whether the operation would culminate in
the occupation of Baghdad and what role would be assigned to Iraqi opposition
forces are matters that at this writing have yet to be worked out. This plan would
require access to a number of important military facilities in the Arab world that
may not be available if the Palestinian crisis is still unresolved.
The third plan, promoted by the Central Intelligence Agency, is to work more
intensely to exploit internal dissent in Iraq and promote within the military a
coup d’état that would remove Saddam and his entourage from within. Such an
outcome would avoid the need to use U.S. forces and could be presented to the
world as a primarily Iraqi operation.
The most vocal advocates for the early use of force display great optimism as
to the ease with which Saddam can be removed and the strategic benefits that
would follow. Victory in Iraq would bring a better, more humane government
for the Iraqi people and put pressure on Iraq’s neighbors, including Iran, to
change their ways—especially with respect to terrorism, weapons of mass de-
struction, and human rights. Iraq would become a stable, unified country. Over
time, a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict would become more achievable.
An economic boom could follow as billions of dollars of foreign investment
flowed into Iraq to rebuild the country.
More pessimistic scenarios suggest that unless a U.S.-led operation had inter-
national legitimacy, preferably bestowed by the United Nations Security Coun-
cil, it would not be supported by many countries currently in the coalition
against terrorism, including most of our Arab partners. This might not matter if
the war were won easily, but what if the operation went wrong? One concern is
that since U.S. policy is to remove the regime, Saddam and his immediate co-
horts would have no option but to fight, and they would not be deterred from
using whatever weapons of mass destruction were in their possession. They
would probably fire chemical and biological weapons at American forces, Israel,
the Kurds, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. If a weapon of mass destruction were to
strike Israel, especially if it caused substantial casualties, Israel would likely re-
spond massively, possibly triggering a wider regional war, with serious conse-
quences for the stability of key Arab regimes.
Further, it might be more difficult to remove the regime in Iraq than the opti-
mists suggest, even with massive force. Sustained bombing would surely destroy
most of the Iraqi infrastructure, but there is no guarantee it would destroy either
the leadership or all the weapons of mass destruction; a bombing campaign would
likely kill many Iraqi civilians and thereby create a humanitarian crisis; the occu-
pation of Baghdad itself could prove especially costly. If, after a massive campaign,
Saddam Hussein were to emerge alive and uncaptured, the undertaking would be
considered a failure, with politically disastrous consequences for Bush.
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Finally, the economic costs of a major war could be high. In 1991 the United
States garnered billions of dollars of financial support for DESERT STORM from
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Japan and others. This time the U.S. taxpayer would have to
pay the entire bill. A protracted war could cause volatility in the oil market, even a
disruption of supply causing short-term price spikes—at a time when the Asian
economies are in trouble and the United States is just emerging from recession.
These, then, are two extreme scenarios. Probably any military operation
against Iraq would be neither as easy nor as horrendous as the extremes sketched
above. Nevertheless, there is utility in thinking about “best” cases and “worst”
cases. These cases will be discussed in many forums in the coming weeks and
months. It is important to have a public and open discussion on the op-
tions—and especially about “the day after.”
IRAN
President Bush included Iran in the “axis of evil” speech for several reasons. One
was continued U.S. anger at Iran’s support for Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestin-
ian Islamic Jihad in their war against Israel, as well as over Iranian complicity in
the shipment of smuggled arms for the Palestinian Authority on the merchant
ship Karine. A second was Iran’s continued attempts to develop nuclear weap-
ons—a finding shared by the intelligence services of the United Kingdom, Ger-
many, and France, as well as the United States and Israel. Another was
disillusionment with President Mohammad Khatami, who has so far proven un-
able to challenge Iran’s hard-liners or open a direct dialogue with Washington.
Despite President Bush’s harsh rhetoric, there remains much uncertainty as
to the next military actions in the war against terrorism. For many in Washing-
ton, Iraq remains the prime target once Afghanistan has stabilized. Yet, ironi-
cally, having included Iran in the “axis of evil” the administration may have
stimulated greater cooperation, both direct and indirect, between the hard-liners
in Tehran and the regime in Baghdad in a search for common ground against an
increasingly threatening American military posture.
While Iranians still harbor bitter resentment toward Saddam Hussein, these
days Tehran’s hard-liners fear America more than Iraq—and for good reason.
The United States now has military forces in Uzbekistan, Pakistan, and Afghani-
stan, and is reportedly using military facilities in Tajikistan. It retains a formida-
ble military presence on the Arabian Peninsula, in the Gulf itself, in the Arabian
Sea, and in Turkey. Iran is surrounded by American military power, save along
its western border, with Iraq.
If Washington decides on operations against Iraq, the objective will be the
end of the Saddam Hussein regime, which would entail an extended American
military presence in the country; whatever regime follows Saddam would be
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likely to be at least relatively pro-American. Iran would then be surrounded in
all directions by countries hosting American military forces. Further, the end of
the Saddam Hussein regime would remove at least one impediment to a negoti-
ated conclusion to the Arab-Israeli conflict. This would be an anathema for
Iran’s most intransigent mullahs, for whom the demonization of Israel is an
ideological cornerstone. An Iraq under a new regime could become a major fo-
cus for international investment in energy development and production and
thereby overtake Iran as an oil exporter. This, in turn, could further reduce oil
prices at a time when Iran desperately needs foreign exchange to meet its
still-growing population. Under such circumstances, the pressures on the
hard-liners to relinquish power to elected moderates, under Khatami or his suc-
cessors, would be likely to reach a crescendo.
It would therefore be logical for the hard-liners to help Saddam Hussein
avoid being overthrown by American military power. How could they do this?
One way would be to stir up trouble in Afghanistan. So long as there is unrest in
that troubled country, the United States will be under pressure not to expand the
war into Iraq. Another option would be to airlift more arms and support via Iraq
and Syria to the anti-Israeli forces in Lebanon and in the occupied territories, in
the well founded belief that the more unstable the Arab-Israeli front, the more
difficult it would be for the United States to gain support in the Arab world for a
war against Saddam. A third possibility, of which Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld has warned, would be to assist the escape of al-Qa‘ida personnel from
Afghanistan, in the hope that they would cause trouble for the Americans in
other areas, possibly even in the United States itself.
While none of these options is likely to be supported by President Khatami
and his entourage, Khatami has little say in the doings of the ministries of intelli-
gence and security and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Until recently,
rogue elements in these institutions were assassinating Khatami’s own support-
ers. The bifurcation of power in Iran and the failure of the elected majority to ex-
ercise real control over the militant elements of Iranian foreign policy ensure
continued enmity between Washington and Tehran.
While President Bush’s speech caused great concern in Europe, China, and
Russia, there is no doubt he had made a conscious decision to put Iran on notice
that it must change its foreign policy. The smiling face of Mr. Khatami and Ira-
nian help in the early stages of the Afghan conflict do not compensate for the
dangerous activities of the hard-liners.
Whether the United States will succeed in this new, assertive policy is a matter
of intense debate. In the short run, labeling Iran an “evil” state has undoubtedly
strengthened hard-liners and further weakened Khatami. However, most Irani-
ans know that their long-term national interests are not served by playing with
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fire. Eventually the majority will realize that they have more to gain from work-
ing with the United States than against it.
For the foreseeable future, the events of 11 September will influence the interna-
tional environment in which the United States pursues its national interests. A
new era of megaterrorism is upon the nation, an era that will impose many new
codes of conduct upon the key international players. Although American pre-
dominance as a military power has never been greater, 11 September demon-
strated both how vulnerable the United States itself is to attack and how essential
it will be, in coping with future terrorist threats and attacks, to cooperate with
old allies and new friends in all corners of the globe.
Without international coalitions, the most basic tasks of counterterrorism
cannot be met. Intelligence sharing, access to bases, routine policing, and moni-
toring of borders and ports—all require unparalleled degrees of international
cooperation. For this reason the United States must balance its willingness to act
unilaterally in the face of threats to American citizens against the danger that a
too assertive, too aggressive posture would be perceived as arrogant and risky by
many countries who are presently eager to work with Washington.
For the near term, how the Bush administration manages the crises with Iraq,
Iran, and Israel will provide a bellwether of the likely policy direction of the
coming years. So far, the war on terrorism has gone remarkably well—indeed,
better than expected. So long as the pattern of success continues, the administra-
tion will get high marks, especially from its domestic constituency. But if, and
when, resistance stiffens and the campaign runs into trouble, clear international
legitimacy and a well established alliance of partners will be essential.
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